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CHINESE BORDER DISPUTES REVISITED: TOWARD
A BETTER INTERDISCIPLINARY SYNTHESIS
Roda Mushkat*
ABSTRACT
China has long been embroiled in a wide array of territorial disputes
and has occasionally flexed its military muscle in the process. Its con-
duct in such situations has been of great theoretical and practical rele-
vance and has attracted considerable attention from scholars across
the socio-legal spectrum. Researchers in the field of international law
have carefully surveyed official and semi-official Chinese pronounce-
ments and practices, while their social science counterparts have rig-
orously dissected key behavioral patterns. This is an inherently
complex subject that this two-pronged approach has not yet been able
to comprehensively address, however, because scholars engaged in the
enterprise have only completed a partial exploration of a multifaceted
phenomenon and insufficient interdisciplinary alignment. A poten-
tially richer investigative platform, and more effective conceptual
bridge building, may help narrow the gaps in the explanatory
architecture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As is amply documented, China’s relations with its neighbors
have been characterized by great complexity and have given rise to
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serious practical challenges.1 This conceptually intricate and strategi-
cally vital subject has attracted much attention from students of Chi-
nese history who are fascinated by the notion of an East Asian system
of tributary linkages revolving around China—commonly equated
with the “Chinese world order.”2 The construct possesses Sino-centric
underpinnings in that it rests on the premise that China has tradition-
ally sought to establish its centrality and superiority in the regional
context. Its proponents have argued that Chinese relations with sur-
rounding states have generally been hierarchical and ironically une-
qual, two salient features of the country’s domestic structure.3
This seemingly deeply entrenched model of international or-
ganization is believed to owe its coherence to the universal pre-emi-
nence of the Son of Heaven.4 Rather than entailing the division of
territories among sovereign authorities of equal status, it is thought to
involve the subordination of all local political units to the central and
formidable power of the emperor.5 An unambiguous acknowledgement
of the inviolability of the principles underlying this configuration and
strict adherence to the regional hierarchy embodying them have been
absolute requirements for entering into and sustaining meaningful re-
lations with China.6
Embracing additional perspectives, which, if incorporated into
a multi-dimensional theoretical scheme, may either narrow the formu-
lation’s scope or broaden it, may rework the tributary system formula-
tion. A shrinkage occurs when the focus is confined to the distinct
bureaucratic practices relied upon by the foreign policy establishment
1 See generally Robert A. Scalapino, China’s Relations with Its Neighbors, 38
PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 63-74 (1991); Ross H. Munro, China’s Relations with Its
Neighbors: Some Observations Regarding Its Strategy and Tactics, 61 INT’L J. 320-
28 (2006); Zheng Fang, Rethinking the “Tribute System”: Broadening the Concep-
tual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 545-74
(2009); CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC: INSTITUTIONALIZING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY” (2010).
2 See generally John K. Fairbank & S.Y. Teng, On the Ch’ing’s Tributary System, 6
HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD. 135-246 (1941); John K. Fairbank, Tributary Trade and
China’s Relations with the West, 1 FAR E. Q. 129-49 (1942) [hereinafter Tributary
Trade]; JOHN K. FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST: THE
OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS, 1842-1854 (1953) [hereinafter TRADE AND DIPLO-
MACY]; THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER: TRADITIONAL CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS
(John K. Fairbank ed., 1968) [hereinafter CHINESE WORLD ORDER].
3 See generally Fairbank & Teng, supra note 2; Tributary Trade, supra note 2;
TRADE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 2; CHINESE WORLD ORDER, supra note 2.
4 See generally Fairbank & Teng, supra note 2
5 See generally id.
6 See generally id.; Tributary Trade, supra note 2; TRADE AND DIPLOMACY, supra
note 2; CHINESE WORLD ORDER, supra note 2.
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in its pursuit of an essentially Sino-centric strategy.7 An expansion
takes place when the hierarchical and uneven tributary structure is
turned into an elaborate “institution” that reflects both the philosophi-
cal assumptions and organizational rituals pervading the Chinese
world order. This in turn shapes relations and ensures cooperation be-
tween China and other participants in Pax Sinica.8 The potential for
movement in both directions may enhance the construct’s analytical
versatility.
The geographical ambit of the tributary system model has also
been redefined in a more limited fashion, rendering it less ambiguous
than before. It has been asserted that China’s claim of being ‘ruler of
the tianxia’ has not signaled a desire to dominate the known world.9
Rather, it has been restricted to the areas adjacent to the Chinese em-
pire, roughly corresponding to those currently referred to as Northeast
Asia and Southeast Asia.10 China has not aspired to control States ly-
ing outside this sphere of influence and has often treated them as
equal.11 Moreover, even East Asian States have not been targeted in a
uniform manner, with some deemed to be more crucial than others.12
This highlights the need to consistently maintain focus on China’s re-
lations with its neighbors and to not be exclusively concerned with su-
perpower ties, currently primarily the United Sates, but previously the
Soviet Union as well.
By the same token, it is historically inappropriate to ascribe
static qualities to the tributary structural configuration, whatever its
manifestations and scope. There is evidence to suggest that the config-
uration’s robustness has varied over time, depending on real or appar-
ent Chinese capabilities.13 During periods characterized by relative
strength vis-a`-vis surrounding states, China has tended to embrace
the paradigm more vigorously than during phases marked by compar-
7 See generally A. DOAK BARNETT, THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN CHINA:
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS (1985).
8 Pax Sinica means “Chinese Peace” and refers to periods in the country’s history
when China maintained the dominant civilization in the region due to its political,
economic, military, and cultural power. It is believed that a renewed Pax Sinica in
central Asia may maintain stability in the region. See generally Yongjin Zhang,
System, Empire, and State in Chinese International Relations, in EMPIRES, SYS-
TEMS, AND STATES: GREAT TRANSFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 43-63
(Michael Cox, Tim Dunne & Ken Booth eds., 2002).
9 See Zheng, supra note 1, at 554-55.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 An analysis of which East Asian states are more crucial centers on core versus
periphery, inner vassal domain versus outer vassal domain, and so forth. See id.
13 See id. at 555-57.
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ative weakness.14 The corollary is that, other things being equal, rela-
tions with neighbors should presently loom large on the scholarly
agenda because of Chinese economic dynamism and military
resurgence.
Even the strength/weakness dichotomy ought to be employed
cautiously, however, as merely one of several potentially relevant in-
fluences. Rapid output expansion, coupled with a rising standard of
living and the ability to prevail in armed conflict, has not always
predisposed China’s leaders to act in accordance with the tributary
system formulation.15 Additional variables have entered into their de-
cision calculus including the behavior of other States.16 The aug-
mented model should arguably extend beyond the socio-cultural realm,
which features prominently in the tributary structure paradigm,17
propelling the study of China’s relations with its neighbors in a genu-
inely multifaceted direction.
The appeal of such an approach has become apparent during
the post-1978 reform era, a period of relative strength, but one that
has witnessed a discernible, if not wholesale, shift from staunch advo-
cacy of sovereign rights, non-interference, and bilateral ties with hege-
monic powers,18 to a willingness to embrace cooperative
multilateralism in the East Asian region and surrounding areas.19
14 See id.
15 See Zheng, supra note 1, at 556-57.
16 One of the limitations of the original construct is that it is one-sided, overlook-
ing inputs from non-Chinese sources and two-way interaction. See id. at 557.
17 See id. at 557-58.
18 See generally DAVID SCOTT, CHINA STANDS UP: THE PRC AND THE MODERN IN-
TERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2007); DAVID SCOTT, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYS-
TEM, 1840-1940: POWER, PRESENCE, AND PERCEPTIONS IN A CENTURY OF
HUMILIATION (2008); DAVID SCOTT, THE CHINESE CENTURY? THE CHALLENGE TO
GLOBAL ORDER (2008); JULIA LOVELL, THE OPIUM WARS: DRUGS, DREAMS, AND THE
MAKING OF CHINA (2011).
19 See generally CHUNG, supra note 1; NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (1994); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY (2002); KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION TO
REFORM (2d ed. 2004); JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE
ECONOMIC REFORM (2005); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSI-
TIONS AND GROWTH (2007); LOREN BRANDT & THOMAS G. RAWSKI, CHINA’S GREAT
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (2008); CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2008) [hereinafter NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER]; CHINA TURNS TO MULTILATERALISM: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL SE-
CURITY (Guoguang Wu & Helen Landowne eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA TURNS
TO MULTILATERALISM]; TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA (3d ed.
2011); GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA AS A LEADER OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2012);
NICHOLAS R. LARDY, SUSTAINING CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH AFTER THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012).
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This has culminated in the “Good Neighbor Policy,” which has been
pursued actively, rather than merely passively, on several fronts, al-
beit by no means single-mindedly and unreservedly.20
Chinese interactions with adjacent States are consequently no
longer portrayed as a pure zero-sum game and are increasingly
presented as an amalgam containing positive-sum elements.21 Nor is
it just a matter of collaboration or lack thereof. The exploration of
China’s  relations with its neighbors has inevitably evolved in the pro-
cess of intellectual expansion into a more complex enterprise, incorpo-
rating diverse theoretical perspectives and drawing on an array of
fields of academic inquiry, encompassing law and key branches of the
social sciences – notably business, economics, politics, and sociology –
and at times crossing established disciplinary lines.22
This reconfiguration is not adequately reflected in surveys of
Chinese approaches to border issues, particularly those marked by dis-
agreement and friction. From the middle phase of the reform era to the
present, only a handful of in-depth empirical investigations have ad-
dressed the subject.23 They have displayed positive-sum attributes24
and analytical rigor,25 but the output generated does not amount to a
critical mass and considerable gaps remain. Some of the research con-
ducted, although conceptually solid, has not been significantly ex-
tended beyond conventional legal boundaries.26 Further, social science
efforts have largely been directed toward examining specific proposi-
tions, some derived from a two-level model of international
bargaining.27
20 See generally CHUNG, supra note 1.
21 See generally id.; NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 19; CHINA TURNS TO
MULTILATERALISM, supra note 19.
22 See generally NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 19; CHINA TURNS TO MUL-
TILATERALISM, supra note 19; CHUNG, supra note 1.
23 See generally BYRON N. TZOU, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE BOUNDARY
DISPUTES (1990); RAMES AMER, THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING THE BORDER DIS-
PUTES BETWEEN CHINA AND VIETNAM (1998); CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLIT-
ICS, INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING, AND CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (2004)
[hereinafter CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES]; M. TAYLOR FRAVEL, STRONG BOR-
DERS, SECURE NATION: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DIS-
PUTES (2008); JUNGWU PAN, TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF CHINA’S TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES (2009).
24 See generally TZOU, supra note 23; PAN, supra note note 23.
25 See generally CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23; FRAVEL, supra note
23.
26 See generally TZOU, supra note 23; PAN, supra note 23. But cf. FRAVEL, supra
note 23.
27 See generally CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23; Chien-peng Chung,
Resolving China’s Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis, 12 J. CHINESE
POLI. SCI. 49-71 (2007) [hereinafter Resolving China’s Island Disputes].
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The corollary is that there is ample scope for delving further
into the topic and producing additional insights. This is the aim of the
present paper. A descriptive literature review is first performed, in two
stages, with a view to outlining the principal strategies followed by
scholars in this policy domain and their core findings. An evaluation of
the same body of writings is then undertaken in order to provide, in a
forward-looking section, potentially new observations and ones that
may have not been fully developed by the original authors. The explo-
ration is selective, rather than comprehensive, as this is an ongoing
project.
The survey is in the form of a free-flowing narrative rather
than a systematically structured one, meaning it is not conducted in
accordance with predetermined criteria. The work reviewed consists of
all notable, published materials on the topic, but it is modest in vol-
ume. Quality should not be equated with quantity, however, as collec-
tively, the studies dissected exhibit such breadth and depth that they
may legitimately be portrayed as exhaustive in nature. Moreover, al-
though no attempt is made to provide a comprehensive account, their
essence is conveyed here in considerable detail and  key dimensions of
the picture painted are subjected to close scrutiny. Additional lines of
inquiry will doubtless be pursued in the future, but as matters stand
there is a sufficiently solid foundation to assess to what extent interna-
tional law specialists and social researchers fruitfully cross paths in
addressing issues of mutual interest.
II. DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY: LEGAL DIMENSION
The dissection of China’s border disputes over the past two de-
cades began within a framework bearing the hallmarks of tributary
system formulations and ones closely wedded to the notion of a struc-
turally-ingrained defensive Chinese posture. Substantial emphasis
was placed on the People’s Republic of China’s (“PRC”) early distinc-
tion between bourgeois and socialist international law.28 The former
was supposed to primarily govern relations among bourgeois, or capi-
talist, States and the latter was to govern relations among members of
the socialist fraternity.29 The bourgeois variant was perceived as an
instrument geared toward serving entrenched capitalist interests.30
In this fundamentally adversarial context, great importance
was attached to the virtually unfettered exercise of national sover-
eignty.31 This coincided with the view that the bourgeois states as-
pired to perpetuate their dominant status by creating one layer of fully
28 See TZOU, supra note 23, at 7-9.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 11-13.
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sovereign states, and another layer of partially sovereign states.32 The
post-Second World War doctrine of limited sovereignty was thus cate-
gorically discarded.33 While the doctrine of absolute sovereignty was
not unambiguously embraced, the principle of mutual respect for na-
tional sovereignty was vigorously promoted.34
Bourgeois theories pertaining to territorial acquisition were
also rejected because they were seen as legitimizing actions under-
pinned by an asymmetrical distribution of power.35 Adjustments to the
status quo, however, were deemed acceptable on certain grounds, no-
tably if they were conducive to the self-determination of colonial peo-
ples and the restoration of historical rights.36 In this and other
respects, state equality was regarded as a basic tenet of the interna-
tional legal order and one expected to guide Chinese foreign policy on
all fronts.37 International law today should thus consistently and deci-
sively be employed to that end.38
The applicability of such a doctrinal edifice was put to an em-
pirical test in the Soviet Union, Burma, and India shortly after the
Communist Party gained power in 1949.39 The pattern that emerged
was not clear-cut; rather, it reflected a mixture of strategic assertive-
ness and pragmatic accommodation.40 For example, while recovery of
territories to which historical claims could be established loomed large
on the policy agenda, and force was resorted to for this purpose,41
there was an unmistakable desire to achieve a modicum of regional
stability, which was given expression in the good neighbor strategy
and the five principles of peaceful coexistence.42 Additionally, remark-
able flexibility was displayed at times. For example, China did not in-
sist on the prompt return of “lost territory” by Southwestern neighbors
and even accepted arrangements such as conceding sovereignty over
the Namwan Assigned Tract to Burma in exchange for three small
villages.43
Such adaptations in the face of conflicting policy pressures did
not prompt pioneering international legal researchers to relegate the
32 See id. at 11.
33 Interestingly, this doctrine was selectively practiced by the Soviet Union. See
id. at 11-12.
34 See TZOU, supra note 23, at 12.
35 See id. at 13.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 13-14.
38 See id. at 14-16.
39 See id. at 23-44.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 29-35.
43 See id. at 32.
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vastly important issue of unequal border treaties to the analytical pe-
riphery. The question of ceded or leased territories – potentially in-
cluding, according to some counts, Annam (Vietnam), the Amur and
Ussuri river basins, areas north of Ili, Bhutan, Borneo, Burma, Cey-
lon, Java, Kholand, Nepal, Penhu Archipelago (the Pescadores), Ryu-
kyu (Okinawa), Sulu Archipelago, Taiwan, and Thailand – continued
to loom large on the scholarly agenda.44 Key unequal treaties – nota-
bly, the Outer Mongolian-Soviet, Sino-Burmese, and Sino-Russian Ac-
cords – failed to satisfy criteria of “mutual benefit and equality,” and
were thus subjected to close scrutiny.45
Efforts to abrogate or revise such treaties, prior to and follow-
ing the 1949 regime change, were carefully documented.46 It can be
said that, on the whole, they yielded distinctly modest results and, as
indicated earlier, occasionally even culminated in possibly unfavorable
agreements with scarcely formidable neighbors.47 It is reasonable to
argue, however, that traditional international law research did not
produce, at least initially, an entirely clear and conceptually grounded
picture in this respect. Essential facts were presented, but not necessa-
rily in a truly coherent fashion, and theoretical construction was con-
fined to elementary observations.
A less ambiguous and more structurally solid account was pro-
vided of the Chinese approach to the procedural and technical dimen-
sions of international treaty formation involving border-related issues.
Legal researchers operate comfortably within this intellectual and pro-
fessional domain, and matters regarding definition, classification, pro-
cedure, interpretation and abrogation, third parties, state succession,
change of government, estoppel, and acquiescence have been ad-
dressed in a detailed and insightful, albeit largely descriptive and non-
explanatory, fashion.48
A review of the mechanics of border determination, underlying
assumptions, and dispute settlement methods was conducted in an
equally sound factual manner. Factors impinging on decisions pertain-
ing to boundary demarcation and delimitation – such as former trea-
ties, customary borders, national defense considerations, geographical
elements, natural features, cultural influences, and geometrical pat-
terns – were painstakingly highlighted.49 Similar care was exercised
in identifying the steps relied upon in the process – typically including
the signing of a preliminary agreement, setting up a joint committee
44 See id. at 77.
45 See id. at 79-83.
46 See id. at 83-86.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 91-112.
49 See id. at 113-20.
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for investigations and survey, erecting permanent boundary markers,
concluding a formal treaty, and exchanging a final protocol.50
Dispute settlement methods were divided into peaceful meth-
ods and those requiring the use of force.51 The principal techniques
placed in the former category were negotiation, inquiry and concilia-
tion, mediation, adjudication, and arbitration.52 These institutional
channels for pursuing orderly accommodation attracted the bulk of
scholarly attention, but recourse to violence, whether proactive or re-
active, was not altogether overlooked because it was not an uncommon
phenomenon during the 1949-78 revolutionary era, particularly on the
Indian and Soviet fronts, where China faced determined and formida-
ble adversaries.53
Certain features of this first, elaborate survey of the interna-
tionally relevant Chinese approaches to border management, as seen
through a law-centered lens, stood out from an analytical perspective.
While China had territorial disputes with virtually all of its numerous
neighbors, it was inclined to avoid confrontation, notably of a military
nature, and generally preferred to pursue its goals in an orderly fash-
ion, readily engaging in give-and-take via formal and informal chan-
nels, provided it did not entail submission to third-party judgment.
Nor did it persistently signal its opposition to well-established interna-
tional legal principles, but instead often acted in accordance with
them.54
By the same token, an insistence on recovery of lost territories,
which regularly surfaced during international interactions, was rather
muted. Indeed, there was a frequent willingness to accept prevailing
realities, including circumstances where there was discomfort about
the historical origins of the status quo. It appears that Chinese policy
makers were more concerned about fairness in the process than with
fairness in the outcome.55 Alternatively, other strategic objectives,
such as an overwhelming desire to achieve regional stability, may
have overshadowed what proved to be a lesser consideration.
Treaties perceived as blatantly unequal posed considerable dif-
ficulties. In the case of the Sino-Russian boundary accords, China de-
manded that they be acknowledged as unequal and nullified, a step
the Soviets, who went no further than offering minor adjustments to
the existing configuration, refused to take.56 It is noteworthy, how-
50 See id. at 120-21.
51 See id. at 125-33.
52 See id. at 125-32.
53 See id. at 132-33.
54 See id. at 71-72.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 86.
33074-rgl_12-1 Sheet No. 31 Side B      03/27/2013   16:17:47
33074-rgl_12-1 Sheet No. 31 Side B      03/27/2013   16:17:47
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-1\RGL103.txt unknown Seq: 10 27-MAR-13 8:33
54 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 12:1
ever, that accommodation was reached with Burma without any simi-
lar preconditions emerging as a stumbling block.57 The overall pattern
may consequently defy clear explanation, at least one that possesses a
simple structure and leaves no room for ‘random’ fluctuations.
Notwithstanding evidence supporting arguments emphasizing
Chinese pragmatism, there was no lack of manifestations of a reluc-
tance to compromise or abandon certain fundamental positions. As ob-
served earlier, engaging in armed conflict was deemed an acceptable
option, although apparently not an attractive one. Additionally, the
stance adopted regarding some pivotal issues either deviated from ac-
cepted norms or displayed a degree of formalism exceeding that shown
by the other parties to the dispute. An example of the former was the
claim that international organizations cannot conclude treaties,58 cou-
pled with the assertion that only fully sovereign states, as distinct
from dependent political entities such as Tibet, enjoy this power.59
A significant measure of formalism was exhibited in relation to
a broad array of questions. For instance, China contended that to qual-
ify as definitive and complete, an agreement must be mutual,60 con-
tain specific provisions regarding border location,61 and satisfy a wide
range of conditions.62 By the same token, the agreement ought to be
the product of proper negotiations rather than merely consultations,63
signed not initialed,64 leave sufficient scope for reservation and abro-
gation,65 and be reinforced by clear signs that it was put into effect.66
That said, the distinction between formalism and strategic
flexibility motivated by a desire to maximize room for maneuver be-
came blurred on occasion. The posture with respect to reservation and
abrogation may thus be viewed as an indication of the latter rather
than the former. The proposition that state succession and change of
government may readily provide grounds for treaty nullification is an-
other case in point. For example, it was invoked in relation to the Mc-
Mahon Line drawn when India was under British rule and the Sino-
Soviet boundary portrayed as the result of “Tsarist imperialist aggres-
sion.”67 The position that prolonged Chinese “silence” should not be
57 See id. at 86.
58 See id. at 93.
59 See id. at 93-95.
60 A unilateral proposal does not amount to a mutual agreement. See id. at 93.
61 See id. at 95-97.
62 See id. at 97-98.
63 See id. at 98-99.
64 See id. at 99-100.
65 See id. at 101-03.
66 See id. at 100.
67 See id. at 104-05.
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seen as a reflection of acceptance of the territorial status quo may be
looked at from a similar perspective.68
The unwillingness to submit to arbitration and adjudication
may also be viewed as a manifestation of the quest for strategic flexi-
bility or the pursuit of a high degree of policy autonomy. This is a com-
plicated issue, however, and one with a salient cultural dimension
influenced by positioning in the international system. The point is that
the Confucian code of ethics prevailing in China has traditionally dis-
couraged people from seeking redress of grievances through legal
channels, even when legitimate.69 Moreover, Chinese isolation during
the revolutionary era and slow integration into the global community
subsequently, as well as the sense of mistrust and vulnerability engen-
dered by the Century of Humiliation, led to an ambivalent and cau-
tious attitude toward institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution,
such as arbitration and adjudication, because of reliance on third-
party judgment and potentially problematic curtailment of strategic
discretion, which in the final analysis is no different from loss of
flexibility.70
The picture painted by legal scholars in the early 1990s was
subjected to further scrutiny by students of international law two de-
cades later. Despite the positive note struck in the earlier study, it was
observed, without fundamentally challenging the overall validity of
the previous assessment, that China still did not resolve all the border
disputes with its neighbors. It may have settled the ones with Afghani-
stan, Burma, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia,
and (partly) Vietnam, but those with India, Japan, and Spratly Islands
claimants (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) remained
unresolved, notwithstanding the importance accorded to regional sta-
bility and a penchant for pragmatism.71
The more recent work on the topic has some illuminating tech-
nical features. The exclusion of maritime border disputes, commonly
seen elsewhere, was scrupulously avoided because it was deemed to be
arbitrary and unproductive, given their prevalence and the policy sig-
nificance of land-sea linkages.72 A useful distinction was also drawn
between territorial disputes, which entail modes of acquiring title such
as discovery, occupation, cessation, and so forth, and boundary dis-
putes, which give rise to issues such as delimitation, demarcation, en-
forcement, and so forth, although the two categories are so closely
68 See id. at 105-07.
69 See id. at 132.
70 See generally id.
71 See Pan, supra note 23, at 1.
72 Id. at 2.
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intertwined that seeking rigid separation may not be a fruitful
exercise.73
Interestingly, the Chinese approach to international legal mat-
ters, including those involving border disputes, as viewed by students
of international law toward the end of the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury, was not entirely devoid of traditional elements which gradually
receded into the periphery in earlier writings on the subject. The dif-
ference between Li  (Confucianism) and Fa (Legalism) was thus con-
sidered to be relevant for the ‘new’ China, a country fully, or almost
fully, integrated into the global community and economy. Li refers to
the use of moral precepts to regulate human behavior in conformity
with natural law.74 Fa was employed as an instrument to control crim-
inal conduct and was regarded as a mechanism for establishing order
rather than a vehicle for the protection of natural rights.75
The persistent superiority of Li over Fa, both in the domestic
arena and in international society, was reaffirmed and its hierarchical,
tributary-like character re-emphasized. The historic Sino-centric
world order was accordingly portrayed as one underpinned by moral
virtue and, at the same time, as non-egalitarian, or legitimately domi-
nated by China.76 The Fa component eroded further over the years,
and remains simply a supplement to Li.77
Traces of traditional influences are seen elsewhere in the pre-
sent Chinese handling of international legal issues, including bound-
ary conflicts. The preference for informal over formal modes of dispute
resolution is assumed to be an enduring phenomenon, attributable to
Li and its promotion of free dialogue rather than mechanistic adjudica-
tion.78 Indeed, the Confucian conception of minimum social order envi-
sions the disappearance of both litigation and recourse to judicial
intervention, favoring a quest for virtue through processes consistent
with the natural order of social life.79
On balance, however, greater significance appears to have been
accorded to the pragmatic proclivities of the new China. In fact, they
are not viewed as entirely ‘new’ because their manifestations can be
witnessed at previous historical junctures, such as in the form of the
Qing government’s responses to attempts in the mid-19th century by
William A.P. Martin, an American missionary and Sinologist, to intro-
73 See generally id. at 19-68.
74 Id. at 71-72.
75 Id. at 72.
76 Pan, supra note 23, at 73-74.
77 Id. at 73.
78 Id. at 75-76.
79 Id.
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duce international law and its potential merits to the country.80
Whatever the origins of the attitude, it is perhaps best reflected in the
posture that “all should start from actuality,”81 which could be con-
strued as providing justification for virtually any policy stance, includ-
ing on the international legal front.82
Paradoxically, pragmatism was not posited to be always condu-
cive to strict adherence to international law. The latter cannot be
wholly situation-dependent (a pattern ultimately associated with
pragmatic adaptation) as international legal norms and their applica-
tion, although not static, do not vary substantially with circum-
stances.83 If invoked liberally, unalloyed pragmatism may turn
international law into a mere extension of foreign policy or interna-
tional relations, a complex dynamic apparently not absent from tradi-
tional and contemporary Chinese international legal discourse and
practice.84
The inherent tension between a culturally shaped worldview,
reinforced by adverse historical experiences, and pragmatic impulses
tainted by a tinge of realpolitik, was poignantly highlighted by illus-
trating the subtle interplay between these two factors in China’s ongo-
ing responses to challenges impinging on its sovereignty, a concept
intimately wedded to that of territory and at the heart of the Chinese
international legal edifice.85 On the one hand, attention was drawn to
a wide array of official and semi-official documents and statements
clearly indicating that China regards sovereignty as “absolute, indivis-
ible, and perpetual”86 (which implies a firm commitment to: “(1) sover-
eign equality; (2) political independence; (3) territorial integrity; (4)
exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and the permanent population
therein; (5) freedom from external intervention and the corresponding
duty of non-intervention in areas of exclusive domestic jurisdiction of
other States; (6) freedom to choose political, economic, social, and cul-
tural systems; and (7) dependence of obligations arising from interna-
tional law and treaties on the consent of States”).87 On the other hand,
it was emphatically noted that, in practice, the Chinese government
has never scrupulously pursued this lofty doctrine.88
Evidence offered to support the flexibility displayed in concrete
situations included the willingness to negotiate border accords in a va-
80 Id. at 76-77.
81 Id. at 77.
82 Id.
83 See Pan, supra note 23, at 77-79.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 79-80.
86 Id. at 81.
87 Id. at 80.
88 Pan, supra note 23, at 81.
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riety of circumstances on the basis of unequal treaties declared null
and void because they entailed a violation of China’s sovereignty.89
This Chinese duality—juxtaposing rhetorical aspirations with ines-
capable realities—was attributed to a desire to harmonize conflicting
strategic agendas.90 It led China in a direction whereby the country
endeavored to creatively but problematically reconcile the imperatives
of absolute and relative sovereignty or, to express it differently, “to
hold up its wieldy shield of ‘absolute sovereignty’ for its political pur-
poses, although the shield has already been perforated.”91
In this context, clinging to the notion of absolute sovereignty,
even if it is characterized by a degree of inconsistency and selectivity,
may have negative implications for the settlement of border disputes.
The reason is that, by embracing this principle, States inevitably sub-
stitute policy for international law.92 The resulting configuration is
bound to diverge from the ideal of “creating a world ruled by law”
rather than one “ruled by power,”93 because attaining this ideal re-
quires States to accept “the reality of relative sovereignty” and com-
prehensively incorporate international legal norms into their existing
dispute resolution framework.94
Ambiguity, again the product of divergent cultural-historical
forces and strategic orientations, was believed to pervade China’s posi-
tion regarding the sources of international law. Specifically, it was
deemed to be significant that the customary element continued to be
relegated to the intellectual periphery because it largely developed in
the Western world without meaningful contribution from States not
closely integrated into the hierarchically and unevenly structured in-
ternational political system.95 To make matters worse, many of the
tenets to which it has given rise, such as uti possidetis, could legiti-
mately be considered discriminatory and unfair to China and other
marginalized countries.96
At the same time, when policy expediency dictated otherwise,
the Chinese attitude could be more constructive in this respect. In-
deed, even during the revolutionary pre-1978 era, it was not uncom-
mon for China to invoke custom-derived international legal principles
to further its interests.97 Subsequent adjustments on that front have
been mostly inspired by shifts in the country’s position in the interna-
89 Id.
90 Id. at 83.
91 Id. at 82.
92 Id. at 83.
93 Id.
94 Pan, supra note 23, at 84.
95 See id. at 85-86.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 86.
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tional community and corresponding strategic assessments.98 This
manifested itself in key policy domains, such as the stance toward in-
ternational courts and tribunals, notably the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), versus the post-1971 United Nations General Assembly
resolutions.99
That said, the transition from revolution to reform was accom-
panied by a change in the balance between the traditional and prag-
matic elements of the strategic equation, as well as a tendency to
engage with international law in a distinctly selective or fundamen-
tally broad-based fashion.100 To the extent that the international legal
architecture invariably possesses deep ideological underpinnings, such
rebalancing was inevitable due to the marked ideological transforma-
tion that took place following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the
consolidation of power in the hands of liberally-minded leaders like
Deng Xiaoping.101 Fa started playing a more prominent role in foreign
policy decision-making in subsequent years, albeit without completely
overshadowing Li.102
In the new reformist climate, settling boundary disputes, pref-
erably through peaceful means, became an economic imperative for
China, but also increasingly so for the other parties involved given
their growing propensity to embrace liberalization and to engage in
globalization.103 Challenging the territorial status quo and pursuing
revisionist goals proved to be a potentially costly proposition not
merely in terms of the disruption caused, but also in terms of foregone
opportunities related to their inability to enter into cooperative cross-
border ventures, notably in the form of joint development projects.104
This evolving pattern has reinforced the trend toward greater reliance
on established international legal mechanisms, including customary
practices, in addressing boundary disputes.105
The most prominent manifestation of the shift was a less ad-
verse posture toward the ICJ, although not so much that China ac-
cepted its compulsory jurisdiction.106 Concrete steps were taken in the
late-1980s and mid-1990s to give expression to this selectively more
constructive stance.107 Symbolically, the Chinese government sent a
powerful accommodative signal in 1994 when the ICJ elected Shi
98 Id.
99 See id. at 86-88.
100 See Pan, supra note 23, at 91-94.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 94-98.
103 See id. at 98-104.
104 See id. at 104-07.
105 Id.
106 Pan, supra note 23, at 119.
107 Id.
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Jiuyong, a leading international law authority, as a judge.108 In the
following years, China’s legal experts began to consistently display an
appreciation for the functions performed by the ICJ and to recognize
the role it could play in facilitating the resolution of international
disputes.109
Another significant development was the Chinese readiness to
embrace the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which China ratified in 1996.110 This instrument prescribes
mandatory jurisdiction for conflicts stemming from the interpretation
and application of its terms. Indeed, the 1982 UNCLOS features one of
the strongest commitments to compulsory arbitration and adjudication
in the realm of international law.111 In keeping with the notion that
any disputes between parties to the Convention should be settled by
any peaceful means of their choice, it provides that no exceptions or
reservations may be made to this principle unless expressly permitted
by the Convention’s other articles.112 Stubborn Sino-Japanese territo-
rial conflicts prompted China to seek ways to qualify its willingness to
submit itself to dispute settlement procedures within this restrictive
framework, but merely in a limited fashion, apparently suggesting yet
again that Fa was gradually gaining the upper hand in its ‘struggle’
with Li.113
III. DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY: SOCIAL SCIENCE DIMENSION
International legal literature constitutes the richest source of
information regarding Chinese border disputes as, by virtue of its na-
ture, the subject is often addressed by scholars in the field, in one form
or another, in as comprehensive a manner as conventional methods
allow. This is a topic, however, whose understanding may be enhanced
by insights obtained by means typically employed by researchers asso-
ciated with other academic disciplines, notably the social sciences, be-
cause students of international law tend to confine themselves to the
108 Id.
109 Id. at 120.
110 Id. at 122; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
111 See UNCLOS, supra note 110.
112 Id. part XV, art. 279 and part XV, art. 282.
113 See Pan, supra note 23, at 123. See generally Suzanne Ogden, Sovereignty and
International Law: The Perspective of the People’s Republic of China, 7 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1-32 (1974); Jacques deLisle, China’s Approach to International
Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267-75 (2000); KEYUAN
ZOU, CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW (2006); Wang Zonglai &
Hu Bin, China’s Reform and Opening-up and International Law, 9 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 193-203 (2010); XUE HAQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
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formal side of the picture. When they venture further, their explora-
tions generally lack sufficient analytical complexity and are rather
selective.
Two social scientists have examined China’s border disputes in
substantial detail and in a conceptually rigorous fashion,114 one across
a wider historical spectrum and within a broader theoretical frame-
work than the other,115 but both productively so. The more mul-
tifaceted study provides a painstaking dissection of twenty-three post-
1949 Chinese boundary conflicts, both at land and at sea.116 Surpris-
ingly, extensive empirical evidence was presented to convincingly
show that in seventeen of these episodes, China sought compromise
and did not refrain from offering concessions.117 The flexibility dis-
played was quite remarkable, as the territory gained in the final set-
tlement normally amounted to less than half of that which was
contested.118
The far-reaching compromises struck with often recalcitrant
neighbors resulted in border accords in which China relinquished
claims to more than 3.4 million square kilometers of land that were
fully controlled by the Qing Empire at its height in the early nine-
teenth century, for all intents and purposes a staggering volte-face for
a once-great power proudly re-emerging following a decades-long de-
cline and international marginalization.119 Again the facts are difficult
to reconcile with beliefs commonly held in this respect for, “In total,
the People’s Republic of China. . .contested roughly 238,000 square ki-
lometers or just seven percent of the territory once part of the
Qing.”120
Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the Chinese engaged
in armed confrontation in six of the border disputes explored.121 Some
of these conflicts, notably the ones with India and Vietnam, were in-
tensely violent.122 Others, such as those over Taiwan in the 1950s and
with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, occurred at the height of the
Cold War and involved threats of recourse to nuclear weapons.123 That
said, the belligerent rhetoric and military maneuvers yielded scanty
114 See generally FRAVEL, supra note 23.
115 See generally CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23; Resolving China’s
Island Disputes, supra note 27.
116 FRAVEL, supra note 23, at 321–34 (providing an overview of China’s territorial
disputes).
117 Id. at 2.
118 Id.
119 See id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See FRAVEL, supra note 23, at 173–219.
123 See id.
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benefits for China.124 Despite its exertions and the inevitable costs in-
curred, China gained little land that it did not control before the out-
break of hostilities.125
These variations in Chinese behavior went largely unnoticed in
the international legal community, which typically does not delve
deeply into the dynamics of State conduct and inter-State interactions.
Social scientists, on the other hand, found this pattern theoretically
intriguing.126 Leading schools of thought in the field of international
relations, such as realism and neo-realism, would not effectively ac-
count for most of the initiatives and responses observed in the 23-case
sample.127 After all, one could legitimately “expect a [S]tate with
China’s characteristics to be uncompromising and prone to using force
in international disputes, not conciliatory,”128 yet this regional power
“rarely exploited its military superiority to bargain hard for the terri-
tory it claims or to seize it by force.”129
Nor did the growth of Chinese strategic capabilities post-1949,
and even more so post-1978, lead to greater assertiveness vis-a`-vis
neighboring countries, implying that the accumulation of relative
power may not always have a corresponding impact on State behav-
ior.130 Analytical propositions employing key nationalistic and institu-
tional frameworks proved equally problematic. The fact is that the
Chinese were “quite willing to offer territorial concessions despite his-
torical legacies of external victimization and territorial dismember-
ment under the Qing.”131 By the same token, China “escalated only a
minority of its territorial conflicts even with a highly centralized, au-
thoritarian political system that places few internal constraints on the
use of force.”132
Chinese state conduct in this specific domain may of course be
viewed simply as a conceptual outlier, not consistent with overall his-
torical trends and thus requiring no further theoretical elaboration.
However, this is too large a sample, extending over too long a period,
and involving too many imponderables, to be relegated to the analyti-
cal periphery.133 There is also some variation within the set, with sev-
enteen seemingly baffling cases versus six less puzzling ones.134 The
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 FRAVEL, supra note 23, at 2.
129 Id. at 2.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 2.
132 Id. at 2.
133 See FRAVEL, supra note 23, at 2–4.
134 See id.
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corollary is that this is a configuration worth examining from a
methodical, albeit perhaps not mainstream, social science
perspective.135
Indeed, the systematic, predominantly quantitative dissection
of border disputes is a well-established undertaking that has gener-
ated substantial insights.136 It has been noted that alliance partners
and democracies embroiled in territorial conflicts are more inclined to
compromise and resolve their disputes peacefully than non-aligned
and non-democratic States.137 Additionally, all actors in such circum-
stances are more likely to resort to violence if the contested territory is
of significant strategic value for economic, national security, political,
social, or symbolic reasons.138 Finally, it has been shown that capabili-
ties matter, or that relatively strong military states tend to resort to
coercion more readily than relatively weak ones.139
The explanatory potential of these seemingly compelling obser-
vations was deemed modest in the quest for an understanding of
China’s behavior regarding border disputes.140 It was concluded that
this was due to an overly heavy emphasis on factors contributing to
conflict escalation and stabilization, or the features of the conflict it-
self, rather than those factors impinging on State decisions or the in-
centives driving the parties to the dispute in one direction or
another.141 As amply reflected in Chinese conduct toward Taiwan, the
latter may inspire opposing players to delay tactics, cooperation, or
confrontation if a rationalist and state-centric conceptual framework is
embraced, and assuming that the State is a unitary actor.142
No elaborate account of delaying tactics was provided, as this
was not the principal objective of the study, although some light was
shed on how they were crafted and deployed during the revolutionary
and reform eras.143 A four-dimensional scheme was proposed, on the
other hand, to explain what might tilt parties embroiled in territorial
conflicts toward either cooperation or escalation.144 The dimensions
singled out were the value of contested land, claim strength in dispute,
135 See id.
136 See id. at 10.
137 See id. at 10–11.
138 See id. at 11.
139 See id. See generally GARY GOERTZ & PAUL F. DIEHL, TERRITORIAL CHANGES
AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1992) (describing the relationship between states’
military strength and territorial disputes).
140 Id.
141 See FRAVEL, supra note 23, at 11.
142 See id. at 12–13.
143 See, e.g., id. at 134–35, 222, 252.
144 See id. at 38–39.
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the security environment, and scope conditions.145 The first three vari-
ables are viewed as pivotal and explored in substantial detail, both
generally and in this specific geographic and historical context.146
Cooperation may thus materialize when land is regarded as
less valuable; a state’s relative position in a dispute is stable, strong,
or strengthening; when it faces neither internal nor external threats to
its security; and when an opponent is able to provide military, eco-
nomic, or diplomatic support.147 On the contrary, conflict may escalate
when land is seen as more valuable; when a state’s position in a dis-
pute is declining or, alternatively, when it suddenly and temporarily
improves; when it faces internal or external threats to its security; and
when it is able to execute a limited-aims operation without suffering
destruction of its entire armed forces.148
The distinction between the dimensions relied upon here to ac-
count for variations in China’s handling of its border conflicts and
those identified in previous empirical work, such as the value of con-
tested land, was perhaps not always made sufficiently clear. But, un-
like elsewhere, these dimensions were explicitly incorporated into a
decision-oriented model acknowledging the State’s potential to engage
in discretionary action grounded in cost-benefit calculus. Importantly,
the author was also able to demonstrate, even if for the most part qual-
itatively, that the four-dimensional construct may adequately explain
a Chinese propensity to employ, or refrain from employing, coercion in
territorial disputes.149
Nevertheless, despite the lengths to which the author goes to
counter possible methodological criticisms, the extensive and rigorous
survey has a number of problematic facets. Notably, the parties to the
dispute are rather loosely connected. For all intents and purposes,
each party formulates its strategies independently of the other. The
picture that emerges thus sheds greater light on foreign policy deci-
sion-making than international relations. By the same token, in accor-
dance with the unitary actor hypothesis, domestic forces in China and
145 See id. at 37–39.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 38.
148 See id.
149 See generally id. at 70–299; M. Taylor Fravel, Securing Borders: China’s Doc-
trine and Force Structure for Frontier Defense, 30 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 705 (2007);
M. Taylor Fravel, Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute, in GET-
TING THE TRIANGLE STRAIGHT: MANAGING CHINA-JAPAN-US RELATIONS 144 (Gerald
Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun & Wang Jisi eds., 2010); M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Rise:
Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion, 12 INT’L STUD. REV. 505
(2010); Alstair I. Johnston, China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior, 1948-
1992: A First Cut at the Data, 153 CHINA Q. 1 (1998).
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in neighboring countries are accorded scant attention and are effec-
tively ruled out as a significant element in conflict dynamics.
These deficiencies, or deliberate omissions, were addressed in
another social science research project, albeit one less comprehensive
in scope.150 The explicit aim of the project was to pinpoint the inter-
play between influences emanating from external and internal arenas
in the process of dispute settlement, peaceful or otherwise, involving
opposing territorial claims.151 The guiding assumption was that
the critical theoretical task confronting scholars in the
field of international politics is to develop generalizing
propositions about state behavior based on the premise
that foreign policy leaders are attentive to the incentives
and constraints generated by both their domestic and in-
ternational environment. . .[and that] powerful explana-
tions of international conflict behavior cannot be derived
from theoretical models that fail to consider the simulta-
neous impact of both domestic and international-level
variables.152
The specific analytical vehicle employed for this purpose was
developed and tested by a leading American political scientist153 and
explored further, both conceptually and empirically, by other social
scientists and socio-legal researchers,154 some of whom focused on the
Chinese context.155 It is commonly referred to as the “two-level game”
150 See generally CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23; Resolving China’s
Island Disputes, supra note 27.
151 Id.
152 PAUL K. HUTH, STANDING YOUR GROUND: TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFLICT 7 (1996) .
153 See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic
of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
154 See generally DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DO-
MESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds.,
1993); Howard P. Lehman & Jennifer L. McCoy, The Dynamics of the Two-Level
Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations, 44 WORLD POL. 600
(1992); Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions:
The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127
(2010).
155 See generally Krishna P. Jayakar, The United States-China Copyright Dispute:
A Two-Level Games Analysis, 2 COMM. L. & POL’Y 527 (1997); HONGYING WANG &
MATTHIAS KAELBERER, THE TWO-LEVEL GAME OF CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
(2006); Albert S. Yee, Domestic Support Ratios in Two-Level Bargaining: The US-
China WTO Negotiations, 4 CHINA REV. 129 (2004); Albert S. Yee, Semantic Ambi-
guity and Joint Deflections in the Hainan Negotiations, 2 CHINA: INT’L J. 53 (2004).
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model.156 It falls squarely into the rationalist tradition, which does not
lack followers in the field of international law.157 One key feature,
however, is that it relaxes the theoretical requirement that States be
treated as unitary actors, or discards the notion that they may realisti-
cally be portrayed as such, by introducing domestic groups into the
foreign policy decision-making dynamics in general and also in exam-
ining China’s initiatives and responses in various international
settings.158
Bargaining between states that are embroiled in border dis-
putes or other conflicts is assumed to unfold in both international
(Level I) and domestic (Level II) arenas.159 Agents of the state and
negotiators on both sides are engaged in a complex process, endeavor-
ing to reconcile, within an often tight “bargaining space” or “area of
compromise,” divergent national interests and demands of domestic
constituencies.160 It is posited that any Level I agreement must ulti-
mately be endorsed by Level II groups.161 This unique feature provides
the vital theoretical link, often missing elsewhere, between the exter-
nal and internal drivers that impinge on international bargaining
outcomes.
The concept of the win-set is at the heart of the construct. It is
the cluster of all potential Level I accords capable of attracting suffi-
cient support, or “winning,” at Level II.162 The fundamental hypothe-
sis put forward is that the larger the win-set of a negotiator, the
greater the room for maneuver he or she enjoys and the more substan-
tial the concessions that may be extracted from him or her by the other
side.163 By contrast, and perhaps paradoxically, a small win-set may
156 See generally CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23; Resolving China’s
Island Disputes, supra note 27.
157 See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RA-
TIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).
158 See generally BRUCE B. DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA,
FORECASTING POLITICAL EVENTS: THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG (1985); BRUCE B. DE
MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA, RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG
(1996); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of International
Legal Compliance: Pre-1997 Predictions and Post-1997 Realities in Hong Kong, 10
U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 229 (2004); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, In-
ternational Law and Game Theory: A Marriage of Convenience or Strange Bedfel-
lows?, 2 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 101 (2005).
159 See, e.g., CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23, at 16.
160 See id. at 16-18.
161 See id. at 16.
162 See id.
163 See id.
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prove to be advantageous in such circumstances because it effectively
ties a negotiator’s hands and implies that he or she is in no position to
compromise.164 Of course, a virtually non-existent win-set is a recipe
for failure since domestic endorsement is, by definition, impossible to
secure.165
Three additional key propositions underpin the model.  First,
the size of the win-set depends on Level II societal preferences and
informal coalitions:166 the more heterogeneous the preferences, the
more difficult it is to satisfy them.167 By the same token, the less sta-
ble the domestic coalition structure, due for example to the presence of
a strong “isolationist” camp, the less smooth the bridge-building ef-
fort.168 Second, the size of the win-set depends on the nature of domes-
tic political institutions.169 For example, the Japanese propensity to
seek as broad a consensus as possible prior to policy action militates
against strategic flexibility.170 Third, the size of the win-set depends
on the strategies of Level I negotiators:171 a negotiator who enjoys
high standing at home is more likely to obtain support for his or her
foreign policy initiatives.172 Negotiators also have reason to seek ways
to boost the popularity of their counterparts since this increases the
size of the other side’s win-set and, consequently, their own bargaining
power.173 This in turn makes “reverberation,” or the ability of negotia-
tors and leaders to affect the preferences of their adversaries through
positive and negative incentives, a crucial factor in the two-level
game.174
The effectiveness of this elaborate construct was examined by
scrutinizing its fit with the facts observed in three protracted and
stubborn Chinese territorial conflicts: the Diaoyutai/Tiaoyutai/
Senkaku Islands dispute, the Zhenbao/Chenpao/Damansky Islands
dispute, and the McMahon Line/Aksai Chin dispute.175 This is a
rather modest sample, compared with the 23-case analysis undertaken
in the other wide-ranging social science survey of China’s handling of
its territorial conflicts. As indicated, however, all the disputes dis-
sected were protracted and stubborn in nature. By extension, each
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 See CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23, at 20-22.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 22.
170 See id.
171 See CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 23, at 23.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.; Resolving China’s Island Disputes, supra note 27.
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could be regarded as a series of interrelated cases, featuring considera-
ble dynamics and variation over time.
Overall, it can be said that the model performed satisfactorily
across the sample. Some gaps were inevitably highlighted. The active
role of leadership in international negotiations may have thus been
underestimated.176 By the same token, insufficient emphasis may
have been placed on the disruptive capacity of highly organized domes-
tic forces determined to forestall progress toward a viable compro-
mise.177 These limitations notwithstanding, external-internal linkages
in the dispute settlement process were traced with a degree of preci-
sion, fruitfully complementing analytical endeavors strictly focused on
the external side of the picture.
IV. EVALUATION
Rather surprisingly, Chinese territorial conflicts, which are
without a doubt of substantial academic and policy interest, have not
attracted great scholarly attention. The number of in-depth studies
produced on the subject is relatively modest. Fortunately, those stud-
ies that do exist are broad in scope and meticulously executed. Moreo-
ver, the insights generated emanate from two distinct, yet, in many
respects, complementary disciplinary sources: law and social sciences.
The conceptual pattern that emerges upon distilling their essence and
reviewing them sequentially thus appears to convey a certain sense of
completeness and wholeness.
Legal research is typically inductive and aims at theory-build-
ing.178 It evolves from an observation to a configuration to a tentative
hypothesis to a theory.179 Social science inquiry tends, at least in the
case of the “harder” disciplines, to be deductive or to be concerned with
theory-testing.180 It proceeds from a theory to a hypothesis to an ob-
servation to a confirmation.181 International law and international re-
176 See id. at 161.
177 See id.
178 See DAVID DE VAUS, RESEARCH DESIGN IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 223 (2001); ROB-
ERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 38-39 (4th ed. 2009);
EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 56-58 (12th ed. 2010); EARL BAB-
BIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 56-58 (5th ed. 2011).
179 See DE VAUS, supra note 178, at 263-66; YIN, supra note 178; BABBIE, THE
PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178; BABBIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL
RESEARCH, supra note 178.
180 See DE VAUS, supra note 178, at 253-62; YIN, supra note 178, at 35-38; BABBIE,
THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178, at 53-56; BABBIE, THE BASICS
OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178, at 54-56.
181 See YIN, supra note 178, at 35-38; BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH,
supra note 178; BABBIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178.
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lations students who have methodically explored China’s border
disputes have followed these divergent paths.
Theory-building and theory-testing are undertakings that vary
considerably in their degree of contribution to knowledge. The former
encompasses an attempt to replicate previously demonstrated effects,
an examination of effects that have been the subject of previous theo-
rizing, the introduction of a new mediator or moderator to an existing
relationship or process, an examination of a previously unexplored re-
lationship or process, and the introduction of a new construct or a sig-
nificant re-conceptualization of an existing one.182 The latter involves
blending predictions with logical speculation, references to past find-
ings, existing conceptual arguments, existing models, diagrams, or
figures, and existing theory.183 Researchers engaged in such activities
may consequently be classified as reporters, qualifiers, builders, test-
ers, and expanders.184 It is fair to portray the legal scholars whose
work has been surveyed here as mostly reporters, qualifiers, and ten-
tative builders and their social science counterparts as determined
testers, although this is merely one dimension of an intricate picture.
Reporting, qualification, and tentative building are by no
means trivial pursuits. In this particular instance, it can be said that
substantial information was produced regarding the norms relating to
Chinese practices with respect to border disputes, their origins, and
evolution. This is a significant contribution, given that norms are ac-
corded such scant attention in the contemporary academic literature
on public policy making,185 including that pertaining to foreign af-
fairs,186 with international law remaining an exception to the rule.187
There is considerable evidence to suggest that norms do play a non-
182 See Jason A. Colquitt & Cindy P. Zapata-Phelan, Trends in Theory Building
and Theory Testing: A Five-Decade Study of the Academy of Management Journal,
50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1281, 1282-85 (2007).
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See, e.g., MICHAEL HOWLETT ET AL., STUDYING PUBLIC POLICY: POLICY CYCLES
AND POLICY SUBSYSTEMS (3d ed. 2009).
186 See, e.g., ALEX MINTZ & KARL R. DEROUEN, UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY
DECISION MAKING (2010).
187 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); OONNA A.
HATHAWAY & HAROLD H. KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
(2005).
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negligible role in the evolution of territorial conflicts,188 the corollary
being that their omission from factual accounts and explanatory
schemes may be a methodologically problematic step.
The work of legal scholars on China’s border disputes, while
undertaken at different junctures, has another fundamentally attrac-
tive feature in that it is characterized by a fairly high degree of consis-
tency. Clearly, official and semi-official ideas seldom stand still,
notably in a dynamic institutional environment such as that witnessed
in modern Chinese society.189 Some divergences are thus bound to
manifest themselves in writings spanning two decades and no two au-
thors are likely to follow precisely the same path in dissecting such a
complex subject. Still, those authors whose research has been re-
viewed here paint a coherent picture devoid of substantial variations.
In technical parlance, it may be marked by a significant measure of
descriptive validity.190
Moreover, the norms identified as relevant in this context were
not portrayed as cast in stone, let alone inviolable. Rather, a certain
sense of ambiguity and fluidity was conveyed. This analytical posture
is worth highlighting because it accords with the recent trend in the
academic literature to acknowledge—indeed, strongly emphasize—the
elastic nature of international legal norms and the behavioral conse-
quences of that pattern.191 Such a conceptual re-adjustment has
shifted attention toward interpretation and the manner in which it im-
pinges on international realities, as “[i]nterpretation is pervasively de-
terminative of what happens to legal rules when they are out in the
world.”192
That said, as indicated earlier, the largely international law-
inspired perspective on China’s management of its border disputes is
inherently restrictive due to its unavoidably limited scope and its
heavy focus on principles, as distinct from action. The forces shaping
norms are thus selectively outlined, rather than comprehensively ex-
plored. Perhaps too much is assumed as cultural, historical, and politi-
cal fact or taken for granted instead of being exposed to critical
scrutiny. By the same token, the relationship between norms and ac-
tual State conduct remains somewhat vague despite the extensive re-
188 See, e.g., GOERTZ & DIEHL, supra note 139, at 69-78; GARY GOERTZ, INTERNA-
TIONAL NORMS AND DECISION MAKING: A PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM MODEL (2003)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DECISION MAKING].
189 See generally LIEBERTHAL, supra note 19; SAICH, supra note 19.
190 See Joseph A. Maxwell, Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research,
62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 279, 287-300 (1992).
191 See Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why Interna-
tional Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y REV. 127, 127-36 (2010).
192 Id. at 135.
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search undertaken. These are gaps that behaviorally inclined social
scientists may be able to narrow.
Fortunately, Chinese border disputes constitute a fertile field
of inquiry that has not been overlooked by behaviorally oriented schol-
ars. Two book-long studies and a number of solid articles, surveyed in
the previous section, have been published on the topic from a distinct
social science standpoint. They rest on a robust empirical foundation
that consists of a detailed examination of virtually every territorial
conflict in which China has been involved. The qualitative nature of
the investigative endeavor does not detract from its merit, even if re-
search in this area increasingly relies on quantitative tools,193 because
of the meticulous matching of theoretical propositions and historical
data across a wide array of cases.
Nor should this work be viewed as decoupled from the theoreti-
cal mainstream. For instance, the power structure, or States’ relative
strength, is a variable that features prominently in almost all writings
on border disputes, whether they possess qualitative or quantitative
underpinnings.194 The value of contested land is just as broadly em-
braced in behavioral inquiry centered on territorial conflicts, although
it is often couched in slightly different terms, such as resource scar-
city.195 Even the more esoteric two-level game model can be said to
loom quite large on the research agenda of economists, political scien-
tists, and sociologists concerned with the dynamics of inter-State bar-
gaining and negotiations, as evidenced by the substantial volume of
publications on the subject, including from an international legal
angle.196
Nevertheless, the social science analytical facade is not without
chinks, both methodological and theoretical, which cannot be entirely
eliminated by integrating it with its legal counterpart. Perhaps most
problematic is the treatment of each case dissected as a discrete epi-
sode. Some of the cases stretch over a long period of time, but this does
not obviate the need for adopting a research strategy, or a design, that
systematically incorporates a temporal dimension. This is common
practice in methodologically driven case studies,197 and an approach
that is often resorted to, and formally so, by social scientists who focus
on the evolution of territorial conflicts.198
193 See, e.g., GOERTZ & DIEHL, supra note 139; RONGXING GUO, CROSS-BORDER RE-
SOURCE MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2005).
194 See, e.g., GOERTZ & DIEHL, supra note 139, at 89, 92-93, 96-97, 99, 119-20, 123-
24, 128-30.
195 See, e.g., GUO, supra note 193, at 107-30.
196 See, e.g., Trachtman, supra 154.
197 See, e.g., DE VAUS, supra note 178, at 260-63; JOHN GERRING, CASE STUDY RE-
SEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 152-64 (2007).
198 See, e.g., GOERTZ AND DIEHL, supra note 139, at 93.
33074-rgl_12-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B      03/27/2013   16:17:47
33074-rgl_12-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B      03/27/2013   16:17:47
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-1\RGL103.txt unknown Seq: 28 27-MAR-13 8:33
72 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 12:1
The absence of clear linkages between cases, or a proper longi-
tudinal perspective, gives rise to possible theoretical difficulties. The
corollary inevitably is that Chinese foreign policy is wholly dependent
on case-specific situational factors and lacks strong continuity, let
alone powerful inertia. Another implication is that it does not periodi-
cally change in a manner that may be explained within a broad, coher-
ent, and time-sensitive analytical framework. This is inconsistent with
the thrust of mainstream theoretical writings on China’s external ad-
aptation, which generally place considerable emphasis on path depen-
dence coupled with occasional fundamental readjustments.199 To the
extent that social science investigations centered on Chinese border
disputes significantly diverge from this trend, they are characterized
by insufficient convergent validity.200
199 See, e.g., CHIH-YU SHIH, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: A PSYCHOCUL-
TURAL VIEW (1990); CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Thomas W.
Robinson & David Shambaugh eds., 1994); ALASTAIR I. JOHNSTON, CULTURAL RE-
ALISM: STRATEGIC CULTURE AND GRAND STRATEGY IN CHINESE HISTORY (1995);
QUANSHENG ZHAO, INTERPRETING CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THE MACRO-MICRO
LINKAGE APPROACH (1996); CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
FACES NEW MILLENNIUM CHALLENGES (Samuel S. Kim ed., 4th ed. 1998); GERALD
CHAN, CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS (1999); LU NING, THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISION MAKING IN
CHINA (2d ed. 2000); CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DY-
NAMICS OF PARADIGM SHIFTS (Weixing Hu et al. eds., 2000); THE MAKING OF CHI-
NESE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE ERA OF REFORM, 1978-2000 (David M.
Lampton ed., 2001); CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION (Guoli Liu ed., 2004);
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR (Suisheng Zhao
ed., 2004); CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
(Yong Deng & Fei-Ling Wang eds., 2005); AVERY GOLDSTEIN, RISING TO THE CHAL-
LENGE: CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2005); YUFAN
HAO & LIN SU, CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: SOCIETAL FORCE AND CHINESE
AMERICAN POLICY (2005); NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POL-
ICY (Alastair I. Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds., 2006); NEW DIMENSIONS OF CHI-
NESE FOREIGN POLICY (Guo Sujian & Shiping Hua eds., 2007); CHINA’S NEW
DIPLOMACY: TACTICAL OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE? (Pauline Kerr et al. eds., 2008);
CHINA’S ASCENT: POWER, SECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(Robert S. Ross & Zhe Feng eds., 2008); NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note
19; MARC LANTEIGNE, CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION (2009); LAI
HONGYI, THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY: REGIMES, LEADER-
SHIP, PRIORITIES, AND PROCESSES (2010); ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINESE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS: POWER AND POLICY SINCE THE COLD WAR (2d ed. 2010); ZHIQUN ZHU,
CHINA’S NEW DIPLOMACY: RATIONALE, STRATEGIES, AND SIGNIFICANCE (2010).
200 See BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178, at 154; BAB-
BIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178, at 161; Donald T. Campbell
& Donal W. Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Mutitrait-Mul-
timethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81, 81-105 (1959); ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH METHODS 151-52 (3d ed. 2008).
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Nor is it just a matter of divergence from mainstream concep-
tual paradigms. The latter seem to provide modest inspiration for so-
cial scientists who explore China’s territorial conflicts and who
apparently prefer to tread their own paths. Several variables that are
typically included in all-embracing explanatory schemes are omitted,
known as a “deficiency error,”201 and highly parsimonious models are
chosen that do not overlap closely with the former, a content validity
problem.202 By the same token, certain influences that are largely ig-
nored by mainstream students of Chinese foreign policy and interna-
tional relations are deemed relevant in this specific context, a
“contamination error.”203 Even more intriguing is the fact that some
variables are given a distinctly non-mainstream interpretation. For in-
stance, domestic heterogeneity is believed to have had a moderating
impact on China’s international behavior,204 but is assumed to render
bargaining and negotiations an inherently challenging proposition in
two-level games.
The two-level game construct is particularly difficult to accom-
modate within the theoretical mainstream. It does not correspond well
to analytical structures employed to examine the interplay between
external and internal forces on the Chinese foreign policy front.205
Moreover, it does not effectively capture the intricacies pinpointed by
scholars who endeavor to shed light on the dynamics of border dispute
containment and escalation in such settings from a wider conceptual
standpoint.206 In the China context, the sample of cases is also rather
small and there are potentially unresolved methodological issues
stemming from the somewhat arbitrary and unsystematic case selec-
tion in the two-level game model.207
Such reservations do not detract from the theoretical and heu-
ristic value of the social science studies reviewed here. Hypothesis
testing can be said to have provided partial support for the ideas put
forward and to have generated ample analytical insights, no mean
201 See LUIS R. GOMEZ-MEJIA ET AL., MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES 270 (7th ed.
2010).
202 See BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178, at 155; BAB-
BIE, THE BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 178, at 161.
203 See GOMEZ-MEJIA ET AL., supra note 201.
204 See David M. Lampton, China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making
Process: Is It Changing and Does It Matter?, in THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN
AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE ERA OF REFORM, 1978-2000 12-24 (2001).
205 See ZHAO, supra note 199.
206 See Ming Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East
Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (2009).
207 See DE VAUS, supra note 178, at 238-42; GERRING, supra note 197, at 86-150;
David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook 137-51 (3d
ed. 2010).
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achievement in such complex circumstances. Moreover, a solid concep-
tual and empirical foundation has been established that is capable of
sustaining a broad-based research agenda. Still, it is important to note
that the complementary efforts of international law researchers and
social scientists, even if considered in their entirety, have not
progressed to a point whereby closure has been attained and the scope
for further inquiry is limited. Quite the contrary, this remains, in cer-
tain respects, an open field not short of incompletely answered
questions.
V. WAY FORWARD
As emphasized throughout this paper, the pattern of cross-bor-
der interactions in East Asia and Southeast Asia, including Russia
and South Asia, revolving around the rapidly re-emerging Chinese re-
gional and global power, is a vital component of the delicate but vi-
brant Asia-Pacific and world economic-political-security order.
Territorial conflicts and their management are a crucial element of
that dynamic equation and, in the China context, have spawned a rich,
if not voluminous, community of academic literature on the subject.
The breadth and depth of the work undertaken notwithstanding, it
has been shown to contain some gaps that should ideally be narrowed
further over time. Offered here is a tentative roadmap in an attempt to
initiate and facilitate the process.
Ample “raw material” is available for additional research in
this area. Both legal scholars and social scientists, particularly the lat-
ter, have provided a detailed account of virtually every Chinese border
dispute since the founding of the PRC. The database that has been
constructed can be ‘mined’ in search of new theoretical propositions
(“theory building”), or serve as an empirical vehicle for assessing those
and existing alternative theories (“theory testing”). Pursuit of this idea
could occur in a more or less structured way, but the scope for quanti-
tative exploration via techniques such as meta-analysis208 is rather
limited because this form of secondary data manipulation generally re-
quires the original, primary data to be quantitatively organized.209
The two qualitative methods typically relied upon in such cir-
cumstances are the narrative and systematic literature review. The
former surveys a body of academic work, such as the writings on
China’s border disputes, to uncover new or alternative patterns absent
guidance by pre-determined criteria.210 On the other hand, such crite-
ria are the driving force constrained a priori.211 It is possible to call
208 See generally BRYMAN, supra note 200, at 106.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See id.
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narrative literature review “unstructured,” whereas its systematic
counterpart qualifies as “structured.” This paper is part of a larger re-
search project that involves the examination of specific hypotheses on
the basis of a systematic review of the studies surveyed in the previous
sections. The furnished roadmap, however, does not have such an em-
pirical foundation because the primary objective is to demonstrate how
extending the analytical range, by incorporating mainstream concep-
tual insights, may place the work on Chinese territorial conflicts on a
firmer analytical footing, for example by increasing convergent and
content validity.
Norms, or principles, of international law, and their underlying
values, are the logical starting point because they precede action in
most models of the policy process212 and do not vary greatly in the
short or medium-term. Although social scientists increasingly bypass
them in their writings, there is no reason to assume that norms are
irrelevant, even if the linkage between them and State behavior is at
times not obvious. The legal literature on China’s border disputes ef-
fectively highlights the visibility of norms across the foreign policy
spectrum and in this specific domain in particular. Painted in other
studies, notably those focused on the role of international law norms in
Chinese adaptation in the global arena, is a similar picture.213
It is often implied that norms coalesce into a harmonious set,
and the studies reviewed here are no exception to the rule. Some schol-
ars in the field of international relations have compellingly conveyed
the inevitable heterogeneity of norms, the tension among them, the
resolution or management of the tension, and the prioritization of the
norms.214 These scholars draw the distinction between norm struc-
tures that are coherent, and even robust, and those that are conflict-
ing.215 It is suggested that the conceptual and practical intricacies to
which heterogeneity, tension, and conflict give rise may be mitigated
by invoking the fuzzy logic method.216 In the present context, it suf-
fices to acknowledge this phenomenon and to endeavor to place rele-
vant international law norms within a framework consisting of
conflicting, or at least competing, values and strategic impulses, which
do not necessarily remain constant.
212 See, e.g., SHIH, supra note 199, at 38-94.
213 See, e.g., Ann Kent, China’s Changing Attitude to the Norms of International
Law and Its Global Impact, in CHINA’S “NEW” DIPLOMACY: TACTICAL OR FUNDAMEN-
TAL CHANGE? 57-76 (Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris & Qin Yaqing eds., 2008).
214 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 188, at 103-
17.
215 Id. at 103-23.
216 Id. at 110-17.
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A well-documented position commonly held by social scientists,
and vividly epitomized by Mao Zedong’s famous dictum that “political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun,”217 is that power is the domi-
nant value pervading all layers of the social fabric in China – “the cor-
nerstone of [its] politics.”218 Consistent with this stance are arguments
that “Chinese politicians and diplomats are. . .recognized as masters of
power politics, having inherited a well-spring of experience of power
play over the millenniums.”219 Moreover, “[e]ven ordinary [people in
China] realize the importance of power and exercise it in their daily
lives.”220 Power is equated in such circumstances with “who gets what,
when, and how.”221
Traditionally, the Chinese conception of power was confined to
the military realm, with “gunboat diplomacy” as its most prominent
manifestation and the essence of qiangquan zhengzhi (big-power polit-
ics).222 That conception has expanded subsequently to encompass
dimensions such as economic strength and external influence, eventu-
ally morphing into the notion of zonghe guoli or comprehensive na-
tional power (CNP).223  A common assertion is that this is China’s
paramount strategic goal and that it is pursuing it with great determi-
nation.224 However, to complicate matters, CNP appears to have an
ethical component, although its practical significance is shrouded in
uncertainty, and its application entails balancing force and
morality.225
The quest for CNP, at home and abroad, is not a futile enter-
prise. Rather, it is thought to dovetail with power transition theory
(PTT), which posits that a dominant State (i.e., the United States) is
sooner or later overtaken by a challenger (i.e., China), peacefully (e.g.,
the Anglo-American transition at the end of the nineteenth century),
or violently (e.g., the Anglo-German transition a decade or so later).226
217 CHAN, supra note 199, at 29.
218 Id. at 28.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 29.
223 CHAN, supra note 199, at 29-33.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 30.
226 See generally STEVE CHAN, CHINA, THE US, AND THE POWER-TRANSITION THE-
ORY: A CRITIQUE (2008); Jack S. Levy, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of
China, in CHINA’S ASCENT: POWER, SECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 11-33 (Robert S. Ross & Zhu Feng eds., 2008); Steve Chan, Is There a
Power Transition Between the U.S. and China? The Different Faces of National
Power, 45 ASIAN SURV. 687-701 (2005); Renee Jeffrey, Evaluating the “China
Threat”: Power Transition Theory, the Successor State Image, and the Dangers of
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Indeed, once the economic, demographic, military, political, and social
conditions are in place, such a shift is a foregone conclusion, a deter-
ministic instead of a probabilistic outcome, whose inevitability cannot
be altered by cataclysmic events like war and similar eruptions.227
Such distinct realist or neo-realist interpretations have been
fine-tuned to reflect changing strategic realities. Specifically, it is
claimed that the Chinese foreign policy posture has been transformed
from one of offensive realism under Mao Zedong to that of defensive
realism under Deng Xiaoping and his successors.228 Offered to account
for this metamorphosis is an elaborate, learning-centered analytical
framework, grounded in social evolutionary (as distinct from non-evo-
lutionary and semi-evolutionary) thinking.229 It differs from the punc-
tuated equilibrium model often employed for this purpose,230 but has
considerable theoretical appeal. The crucial point to note is that a de-
fensive realist State is less likely to flout prevailing international legal
norms and more likely to seek a peaceful resolution to border disputes
than an offensive realist one, even when there are forces, such as its
relative strength, value of contested land, and so forth, propelling it in
the opposite direction.
A number of criteria have been suggested for distinguishing be-
tween defensive realist States and offensive realist ones. Some authors
emphasize ideology, attitude toward domestic minorities, stance re-
garding arms control, and policy vis-a`-vis neighboring countries, par-
ticularly weaker ones.231 Others highlight a recognition of the benefits
of international cooperation and a willingness both to exercise self-re-
straint and to be constrained by other States.232 These operational
norms have inevitable implications for China’s approach to the settle-
ment of border disputes if today’s China does indeed acknowledge the
merits of collaborative international and regional arrangements, as ev-
Historical Analogies, 63 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 309-24 (2009); Douglas Lemke, Power
Transition Theory and the Rise of China, 29 INT’L INTERACTIONS 269-71 (2003);
Ronald L. Tammen & Jacek Kugler, Power Transition and China US Conflicts, 1
CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 35-55 (2006), available at http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/con-
tent/1/1/35.full.pdf+html.
227 See Levy, supra note 226, at 11-16.
228 Tan Shiping, From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary In-
terpretation of China’s Security Strategy, in CHINA’S ASCENT: POWER, SECURITY,
AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 141-62 (Robert S. Ross & Zhu Feng
eds., 2008).
229 Id. at 146-48.
230 See generally INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 188.
231 See generally Andrew Kydd, Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers
Do Not Fight Each Other, 7 SECURITY STUD. 114-55 (1997).
232 See, e.g., Shiping, supra note 228, at 152.
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idenced, inter alia, by its strategy of multilateralism,233 does not as a
rule exploit the relative weakness of its neighbors, and does act in a
constrained fashion in the global arena and segments thereof (i.e., in
effect, practices limited sovereignty).234
Assuming that a sense of altruism or other-directedness drives
defensive realist states is not necessarily the norm. Chinese interna-
tional behavior is open to both realist and liberal interpretations. It is
a moot point whether China is “racing to integrate, or cooperating to
compete.”235 If it is the latter, its conduct would not be inconsistent
with realist or at least neo-realist (or, alternatively, institutionalist)236
readings, and the quest for power might remain a key element of the
equation. However, it would constitute a different, more constructive
and multifaceted quest than might be the case if a narrower, less ac-
commodative and elastic set of premises provided the inspiration for
the analytical structure.
In augmented realist and non-realist accounts, values other
than power enter into the Chinese foreign policy calculus. In some so-
cial science research, an even greater emphasis is thus placed on
China’s “struggle for status,”237 and not necessarily along realist lines
(“[i]ronically, when the term is used in [international relations], it is
often by realists, who equate the status struggle with a state’s jockey-
ing for a higher position in the pecking order of power. . .[m]y applica-
tion here is based on a rejection of key assumptions in the mainstream
realist paradigm”).238 The significance accorded to this value stems
233 See generally NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 19; CHINA TURNS TO
MULTILATERALISM: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL SECURITY (Guoguang Wu &
Helen Lansdowne eds., 2008); Jenny Clegg, CHINA’S GLOBAL STRATEGY: TOWARD A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD (2009).
234 See generally Allen Carlson, More Than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Ap-
proach to Sovereignty and Intervention Since Tiananmen, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 217-41 (Alastair I. Johnston & Robert S.
Ross eds., 2006); Shan Wenhua, Redefining the Chinese Concept of Sovereignty, in
CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 53-80 (Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yong-
nian eds., 2008).
235 See generally Thomas G. Moore, Racing To Integrate or Cooperating To Com-
pete? Liberal and Realist Interpretations of China’s New Multilateralism, in CHINA
AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 35-50 (Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian
eds., 2008).
236 See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT
O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD ECON-
OMY (1984).
237 See generally Yong Deng, Better Than Power: “International Status” in China’s
Foreign Policy, in CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POL-
ICY 51-72 (Yong Deng & Fei-Ling Wang eds., 2005); YONG DENG, CHINA’S STRUG-
GLE FOR STATUS: THE REALIGNMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2008).
238 Id. at 1-2.
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from the fact that “the Chinese are intensely sensitive to their nation’s
‘international status,’ treating it as if it were the overriding foreign
policy objective.”239
Paradoxically, the belief is that the acquisition of power does
not diminish the thirst for status: “Although history matters, contem-
porary China’s status consciousness would not be so acute if it were
not for its ongoing phenomenal ascendency in comprehensive
power.”240 This is because “[g]rowing wealth generates an expectation
of greater respect.”241 Given the disparity between its power and sta-
tus, when “[f]aced with the established—albeit still evolving—world
order, the PRC naturally feels that its great-power rise is yet to be
duly recognized.”242 Accordingly, overlooking this point when seeking
explanations for Chinese responses in situations involving border dis-
putes would be a mistake if this diagnosis was correct.
International law scholars have not yet fully explored the rele-
vant cultural norms, and the norms are, in reality, paid no heed by
social scientists. Yet, the inherent tension between the two strands
and their divergent impact on China’s foreign policy is examined ex-
tensively in other contexts.243 One is the realpolitik view of the world,
which “holds that conflicts are perennial and zero-sum”244 and “re-
gards the use of force as the only effective means [of] ensuring secur-
ity, stability, and peace.”245 The other is the Confucian-Mencian
worldview, which conceives international society as “harmonious, or-
derly, and hierarchically structured.”246 Consistent with this image,
“[c]onflicts are regarded as largely deviant phenomena rather than the
nature of things and should and can be managed through means other
than the use of brute force.”247
Scholars believe that the Confucian-Mencian outlook displays
an aversion to the use of force and a willingness to countenance its
prospect only as a last resort, a strategic device employed for no pur-
poses other than the fulfillment of public interest and self-defense.248
It also apparently exhibits a clear preference for defense over of-
239 Id. at 8.
240 Id. at 9.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See, e.g., Chan, supra note 199, at 55-63; Qingxin Wang, Cultural Norms and
the Conduct of Chinese Foreign Policy, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY: DYNAMICS OF PARADIGM SHIFTS 143-69 (Weixing Hu, Gerald
Chan & Daojing Zha eds., 2000).
244 Chan, supra note 199, at 59.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 See Wang, supra note 243, at 147-50.
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fense.249 Additionally, it seems that a strong pragmatic streak, embod-
ied in the notion of chung-yun, which emphasizes the need for smooth
equilibrium in human affairs, characterizes this outlook.250 Interest-
ingly, it has been shown that these norms impinged, to a degree, on
Chinese foreign policy even during the revolutionary era.251 This may
partly explain why the recourse to force, including over disputed terri-
tory, may have been less frequent and less overwhelming than might
have been expected on conventional theoretical grounds.
The constructivist concept of national or State identity, al-
though in need of a realist and utilitarian enhancement to render it a
reasonably precise tool in dissecting foreign policy decision making,252
may also play a meaningful role in grappling with the forces shaping
China’s handling of boundary conflicts. This is a dimension which is
completely lacking in the academic literature surveyed here, but which
has received ample attention elsewhere.253 Where national identity is
acknowledged as an influence that, while not readily amenable to op-
erational definition and quantification, may shed some light, in con-
junction with other pertinent variables, on State action, there may be
some scope for materially broadening the framework within which the
quest for understanding the dynamics of foreign policy making is
pursued.254
Five components of national identity have been outlined in the
present context. The first portrays the Chinese State as a socialist en-
tity with distinct features, which is pursuing material progress in a
manner properly reflecting its unique socio-economic conditions, and
displaying commendable realism in the process (epitomized by the
motto that “practice is the sole criterion of truth”).255 The second mir-
rors China’s assent to global power status, and the heavy responsibili-
ties that emanate from this position.256 Paradoxically, the third
component is not in accord with the second one. It is sustained by the
gap between Chinese living standards and those enjoyed by people in
249 See id. at 150-52.
250 See id. at 146-47. See generally ANDREW SCOBELL, CHINA’S USE OF MILITARY
FORCE: BEYOND THE GREAT WALL AND THE LONG MARCH (2003); QUANSHENG ZHAO,
supra note 197.
251 See Wang, supra note 243, at 152-62.
252 See generally J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 325
(2003); J. SAMUEL BARKIN, REALIST CONSTRUCTIVISM: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY (2010).
253 See generally, e.g., Johnston, supra note 199; Tiejun Zhang, Self-Identity Con-
struction of the Present China, 23 COMP. STRATEGY 281 (2004).
254 See generally Barkin, Realist Constructivism, supra note 252; BARKIN, REALIST
CONSTRUCTIVISM: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, supra note 252.
255 See Zhang, supra note 253, at 289.
256 See id. at 282-83.
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high-income countries. China is consequently perceived as an eco-
nomic laggard whose loyalties lie with the South rather than the
North.257 This results in a dual-identity syndrome, whereby great
power aspirations and commitments run counter to the images and
obligations stemming from lower-middle income status.258
The fourth component is also at variance with the second one.
It focuses on the informal and modestly institutionalized Chinese so-
cial fabric, compared with the relatively elaborate and transparent or-
ganizational edifice in high-income countries.259 Its manifestations
may be observed on the external front as well as the internal one. For
example, in the early 1990s, the close relationship with Thailand was
depicted as a form of kinship.260 The fifth component, amply empha-
sized in legal writings, was encountered earlier.  It centers on the per-
sistent, even if diminished, preoccupation with sovereignty and the
reluctance, again less intense than in the past, to contemplate its
dilution.261
The second, third, and fourth components may have a bearing
on the issue at hand. A China that sees itself as a global power with
corresponding responsibilities is more likely to display restraint in ad-
dressing border disputes. Interestingly, a self-image that keeps it on
the international periphery need not have the opposite effect. The
point is that a country which identifies itself as a member of the Third
World—indeed, its champion and leader—may be unwilling to resort
to coercion against neighbors, most of whom belong to this “disadvan-
taged” and “marginalized” group.
Norms and identities do not properly explain the ramifications
of the external-internal linkages highlighted by the two-way game
model. A number of Chinese case studies, including those pertaining to
border disputes, lend tentative support to this analytical construct.
However, as indicated, they give rise to a host of methodological issues
and probably constitute a better test of the model, albeit not a robust
one, than a robust account of the mechanisms consistently transmit-
ting impulses from the domestic to the international arena, and vice
versa, in this particular context. Other exploratory paths, notably at
home in China, may yield greater insights regarding the management
of territorial conflicts.
257 See id. at 292-93.
258 See Yong Deng, Escaping the Periphery: China’s National Identity in World
Politics, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 41, 51 (Weix-
ing Hu et al. eds., 2000); Zhang, supra note 253.
259 See Deng, supra note 258, at 51-54.
260 See id. at 53.
261 See id. at 53.
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A broad scheme for examining the external-internal linkages
in Chinese foreign policy making was in fact suggested well before the
two-way game model came into vogue.262 The initial formulation fo-
cused on the conversion of general inputs (international constraints
plus domestic determinants) into general outputs (foreign policy).263
The input side was then expanded by differentiating between the
macro-level and its micro-level counterpart, where decision makers
abroad and at home operate, and by specifying the macro-level inter-
national constraints and domestic determinants that affect output.264
The applicability of the scheme was demonstrated by pinpoint-
ing the impact of changes in such inputs on China’s foreign policy over
time.265 Particularly close attention was paid to the domestic dynam-
ics where shifts in the symbolic macrostructure from revolution to
modernization, institutional macrostructure from vertical to horizon-
tal authoritarianism, power and regime macrostructure from rigidity
toward flexibility, and a wide range of micro processes employing simi-
lar categories, were carefully dissected, the latter in greater detail
than the macro ones because of the diversity typically encountered at
that level.266
As indicated, the micro processes were classified in a corre-
sponding fashion, but possibly not as unambiguously and thus less
meaningfully from an empirical perspective, into symbolic (“change in
the interpretation of the internal and external environments; learning
and adaptation; [and] changing priorities of foreign policy”), institu-
tional (“increased scope and degree of participation in foreign policy
making; [and] changes of norms, rules, and mechanisms in the policy
making process”), and power/regime-related processes (“dynamics of
individual leaders’ power and authority; regime legitimacy; decision
makers preference and choices; [and] foreign policy strategies and
tactics”).267
Besides offering a broad theoretical framework, such a scheme
may also serve the purpose of bringing into focus continuities and peri-
odic shifts in Chinese foreign policy. For instance, in a recent survey,
the following, currently relevant, enduring features have been high-
lighted: (1) the pursuit of cooperation and partnerships with all coun-
tries in Asia and key governments in other parts of the world; (2) the
exercise of self-restraint as part of a strategy to promote a benign im-
age of China as a country that is a source of opportunities rather than
262 See generally QUANSHENG ZHAO, supra note 199.
263 See id. at 19-21.
264 See id. at 22-25.
265 See id. at 25-28.
266 Id. at 25, Table 2.4.
267 Id.
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threats to members of the international community; (3) a willingness
to lower rhetoric directed at American hegemonic practices as long as
the United States does not challenge fundamental Chinese interests;
(4) an increasingly deeper integration into the global economy; and (5)
a progressively firmer commitment to multilateralism.268
Strategic continuity, even if punctuated by periodic paradigm
transformations, paves the way for the consideration of regimes, or
stable patterns of action, rather than case-specific responses, in ana-
lyzing China’s border disputes. This is the emerging trend in social
science research addressing the subject, productively followed in the
Asian space, with selective references to the Chinese situation.269 It
does not obviate the need for scrutinizing individual cases, but ideally
in clusters, rather than in isolation, employing methods designed to
deal with multiple and interconnected historical episodes instead of
relying on those geared toward handling single and self-contained
cases.
The distinction drawn in this paper has primarily been be-
tween the revolutionary and reform eras’ policy regimes, which may
have been marked by reasonably well-defined behavioral propensities
in relation to border disputes. Elsewhere, additional phases displaying
regime-like properties have been identified. For instance, one social
scientist divides the 1949-78 period into a cycle of moderation (until
shortly before the 1958 Great Leap Forward) and of radicalization, and
has divided the period of liberalization that followed into a cycle of
incremental restructuring (up to 1993) and a comprehensive overhaul
of the socialist system thereafter.270 Another social scientist euphe-
mistically portrays the entire revolutionary era as a “catching up” re-
gime, which gave way in 1978 to one characterized by “GDPism,” with
the latter apparently discarded in the wake of the mismanagement of
the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) episode in favor of
“people-centered development” (i.e., a simultaneous pursuit of eco-
nomic betterment, environmental preservation, and social
equality).271
Whatever analytical scheme one adopts, the external-internal
linkages outlined above may exhibit different patterns during differ-
ent policy regimes. Notably, both at the macro- and micro-level, but
perhaps particularly the latter, the post-1978 domestic landscape
268 See SUTTER, supra note 199, at 5-6.
269 See generally Koo, supra note 206.
270 See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC RE-
FORM 31-89 (2005).
271 See Kinglun Ngok, Redefining Development in China: Toward a New Policy
Paradigm for a New Century?, in CHANGING GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
EAST ASIA 49 (Ka Ho Mok & Ray Forrest eds., 2009).
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sharply diverges from the preceding configuration.272 For instance, the
pre-1978 foreign policy process/structure was remarkably fluid, with
key decisions often made by strategically placed individuals such as
Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai.273 It is now a far
more complex and less flexible setting, occupied by multiple actors
who are institutionally much more constrained by previous stan-
dards.274 One authoritative account of the evolution of the foreign pol-
icy-national security establishment lays considerable emphasis on
trends such as professionalization, corporate pluralization, decentrali-
zation, and globalization, and shows that they have had a tangible im-
pact on strategic decisions and tactical maneuvers.275
The impulses running from the international level to the do-
mestic one have been extensively explored, albeit largely within a uni-
tary actor framework, by social scientists, including those with a
quantitative orientation.276 The impulses traveling in the opposite di-
rection have been accorded less attention. Recently, there has been a
rebalancing of research priorities and the internal side has come to the
fore.277 The effects of domestic factors such as the role of top leaders,
cohesion-promoting stimuli emanating from the desire of all key prom-
inent players to preserve the prevailing politico-economic order, cru-
cial events like the SARS debacle, deeply entrenched organizational
patterns, and firmly rooted institutional routines on China’s foreign
policy decisions are thus beginning to be systematically examined.278
Attempts have been made to apply this perspective in a
methodical fashion to Chinese militarized conflicts, including those in-
volving disputed territory, but selectively so.279 This clearly is an ana-
lytical domain where there is substantial scope for further inquiry. An
interesting issue is the relationship between increasing domestic het-
erogeneity, a salient feature of the present policy regime, and the ten-
272 See generally Wang Gungwu, China and the International Order: Some Histor-
ical Perspectives, in CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 19, at
21.
273 See David Bachman, Structure and Process in the Making of Chinese Foreign
Policy, in CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FACES NEW MILLEN-
NIUM CHALLENGES supra note 199, at 34, 37.
274 See generally NING, supra note 199.
275 See David M. Lampton, supra note 204, at 1, 4-31.
276 See generally Alastair I. Johnston, International Structure and Chinese For-
eign Policy, in CHINA AND THE WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FACES NEW MIL-
LENNIUM CHALLENGES, supra note 199, at 55.
277 See generally LAI, supra note 199.
278 See generally id.
279 See Johnston, supra note 149; Thomas J. Christensen, Windows and War:
Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 50 (Alastair I. Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds. 2006).
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dency to either rely on peaceful means of conflict resolution or to resort
to coercion. Proponents of the two-level game model provide insights in
this regard that may be overly mechanistic and may possess insuffi-
cient explanatory power.
Two theoretical constructs may prove relevant in providing a
foundation for fruitfully delving into that question. One portrays
China’s evolving policy regime as a loose network rather than a rigid
hierarchy.280 It draws on a psycho-cultural paradigm that places the
social network (guanxi) at the heart of Chinese political order, demon-
strating its pervasiveness and resilience in varying circumstances,281
and posits that consensus, bargaining, networking, and face-saving282
are the most steadfast characteristics of the policy process in the coun-
try.283 It is argued that this social configuration has morphed into a
mode of governance consisting of “webs and spiders.”284 The former
are “the institutional attributes”285 and the latter are “the actors.”286
The second possibly useful formulation is the fragmented au-
thoritarianism model that depicts China’s one-party political system
as a negotiated State composed of a wide array of vertical lines (tiao)
and horizontal pieces (kuai).287 Despite perceptions to the contrary,
this is a highly complex institutional edifice that is assumed to often
require a massive effort to attain a modicum of organizational cohe-
sion and to shift the politico-administrative machinery forward.288
Such structural intricacy, whether attributed to network-like proper-
ties or institutional fragmentation, may render recourse to force to set-
tle border disputes an organizationally challenging proposition. It may
also lead to an erosion of State capacity,289 with conceivably similar
policy consequences.
280 See generally JOHN B. STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA’S
ECONOMY, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE (3d ed. 2001); MING XIA, THE PEO-
PLE’S CONGRESSES AND GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: TOWARD A NETWORK MODE OF GOV-
ERNANCE (2008).
281 See generally LUCIAN W. PYE WITH MARY W. PYE, ASIAN POWER AND POLITICS:
THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITY (1985).
282 STARR, supra note 280.
283 See id.
284 XIA, supra note 280, at 16.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 19, at 186-87.
288 See id. at 186-88.
289 See generally Jonathan Schwartz, The Impact of State Capacity on Enforce-
ment of Environmental Policies: The Case of China, 12 J. ENV’T & DEV. 50 (2003);
Paul Collins & Hon S. Chan, State Capacity Building in China: An Introduction,
29 PUB. ADMIN. DEV. 1 (2009).
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Given this backdrop, it may not be productive to study Chinese
decisions to resort to force over disputed territory as the sole product of
deliberations by rational, forward-looking, expected utility-maximiz-
ing leaders whose strategy selection is a function of “the values they
attach to alternative outcomes and the beliefs they hold regarding how
their adversary will respond to their strategic decisions.”290 The notion
that they clinically assess the costs and benefits associated with each
alternative to obtain the largest net gain at an acceptable level of
risk291 is, strictly speaking, difficult to reconcile with the complex real-
ities outlined above.
Greater insights may, in all likelihood, be generated by endeav-
oring to identify recurring regime-specific organizational patterns. In
the intricate context of elaborate external-internal linkages, persistent
behavioral trends may still be observed, but probably more consistent
with a configuration akin to that outlined by the cybernetic satisficing
model of decision-making whose proponents highlight the multiple
constraints under which political leaders operate while searching for
an acceptable outcome to an inter-State conflict over contested terri-
tory.292 One way or another, the enormous complexity of China’s stra-
tegic environment, at home and abroad, needs to be acknowledged.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chinese border disputes are manifold and have deep historical
roots. Some, but not all, have been resolved, yet not necessarily in a
manner that might have been anticipated.  Given the international
prominence of the parties involved, notably China, the ramifications of
actions taken and refrained from, the not-easy-to-read policy signals,
and the elaborate strategic maneuvers, this is a subject that merits
careful scholarly attention. Students of international law have re-
sponded to the challenge by exploring it broadly and consistently. The
largely traditional orientation of those involved in the enterprise has
left some inevitable gaps and social scientists have stepped into the
breach.
290 Bruce B. de Mesquita & David Lalman, Domestic Opposition and Foreign War,
84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 747, 750 (1990).
291 See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, THE WAR TRAP (1981); Bruce B. de Mesquita,
The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
156 (1985).
292 See generally Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Brian L. Job, The President and the
Political Use of Force, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541 (1986). For additional insights, see
also Alastair I. Johnston, China and International Environmental Institutions: A
Decision Rule Analysis, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 555 (Michael B. McElroy et al. eds., 1998).
33074-rgl_12-1 Sheet No. 48 Side A      03/27/2013   16:17:47
33074-rgl_12-1 Sheet No. 48 Side A      03/27/2013   16:17:47
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-1\RGL103.txt unknown Seq: 43 27-MAR-13 8:33
2012] CHINESE BORDER DISPUTES REVISITED 87
However, the latter have followed a rather narrow path, with-
out explicitly aiming at achieving a high degree of cross-field conver-
gence. A set of well-defined hypotheses has been put to an empirical
test, with partial success, but the gaps have not been significantly nar-
rowed. Several potentially fruitful avenues of socio-legal investigation
have been identified in this paper. To pursue them productively may
require a more effective interdisciplinary collaboration and synthesis
than witnessed thus far. Rather than operate in parallel, researchers
in the international law field and social scientists may have to circum-
vent existing academic barriers and seek closer conceptual integration.
The general lesson to be drawn here is that this is a theoretically chal-
lenging topic that should ideally be addressed within a comprehensive
analytical framework instead of in a segmented fashion.
The juxtaposition of international legal approaches with social
science strategies of empirical inquiry, in this particular context, leads
to additional, more specific observations. First, despite the failure to
achieve a meaningful convergence, the considerable and selectively
overlapping insights generated independently by a small number of
scholars belonging to two distinct academic disciplines serve as a
poignant reminder of the methodological and theoretical promise of
systematic case studies focused on clearly delineated policy issues,
rather than overarching ones. Attempts to analytically enrich the field
of international law by incorporating concepts from the social sciences
into the prevailing body of thought have largely been confined to the
far macro end of the macro-micro continuum, or to the question of
what consistently drives States when they face legal constraints in the
global arena. This may have resulted in the proliferation of narrow-
based paradigms that are overly abstract and difficult to reconcile.
Such intellectual constructs are inevitably limited in scope be-
cause of the level at which they are formulated. To generalize about
the behavior of States in a manner that is independent of space and
time, researchers need to freely discard relevant information and build
models that consist of insufficient variables and oversimplified rela-
tionships. These problems may be circumvented by endeavoring to de-
velop and test middle-range theories, rather than grand ones, which
often are the product of meta-theoretical exploration, or theorizing
about theories, through studies that concentrate on concrete policy is-
sues such as the management of territorial conflicts by different States
in varying circumstances. The knowledge generated in the process
may then be consolidated in a bottom-up fashion with a view to draw-
ing broad inferences, without materially sacrificing fine detail and
structural complexity. The strengths and weaknesses of the work sur-
veyed here suggest that this is a desirable and realistic undertaking.
The ultimate goal of such an ongoing scientific project must be
a full integration of legal and social science perspectives, which is a
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formidable challenge, but one that does not imply that proceeding in a
stepwise manner is an unproductive strategy. Knowledge creation is a
cumulative endeavor, often entailing the construction of two-level the-
ories that have a structure consisting of a basic level (the core of the
model) and a secondary level (a set of variables that are less closely
related to the fundamental proposition).293 This type of a framework
may prove to be an effective analytical vehicle for scholars comprehen-
sively versed in international law, yet not thoroughly familiar with so-
cial science reasoning, and vice versa.
Better interdisciplinary synthesis is both a conceptual and
practical imperative. Proper understanding and sound management of
international legal issues cannot be attained unless a genuinely mul-
tidimensional approach is adopted. A painstaking examination by the
International Crisis Group (ICG) of the dynamics of recent maritime
boundary disputes in the South China Sea, currently the subject of
much media attention, lends support to this argument.294 Competing
claims by Northeast and Southeast Asian protagonists, and even
outside powers (but with an Asia-Pacific identity), are involved in a
dispute over islands located in an area suffused with historic symbol-
ism, strategically valuable, and to all appearances richly endowed with
vital resources.
China is at the heart of the unfolding conflict. The ISG employs
an informal variant of the two-way theoretical scheme. Its implicit
model revolves around economic, political, and social forces that shape
Chinese behavior at the basic level. These include an array of organi-
zations in both the public and private sector, factional groupings
within such entities, the media, interest groups, and the grassroots
community. Domestic pressures emanating from other countries en-
gaged in the disputes are dissected in a similar fashion and the inter-
action among the protagonists, in terms of the tactics relied upon, is
incorporated into the picture by also resorting to tools of behavioral
inquiry. The practical side, focused on institutional coordination mech-
anisms, is principally viewed through a social science lens as well.
The international law element is not overlooked. Claims ad-
vanced by the countries involved—their forms, origins, and validity—
are carefully scrutinized. This observation equally applies to the pur-
suit, actual and potential, of those claims via legal channels. This en-
293 See GARY GOERTZ, SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A USER’S GUIDE 240-41 (2006).
294 See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, STIRRING UP THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (I) (Apr.
23, 2012), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223-
stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.aspx; INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, STIRRING UP
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (II): REGIONAL RESPONSES (July 24, 2012),  www.crisis
group.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/229-stirring-up-the-south-china-
sea-ii-regional-responses.aspx.
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tire dimension of the analytical framework, however, is accorded less
space and weight and may thus be deemed as a less crucial, albeit still
relevant, ingredient of the conceptual structure. The corollary is that,
as a vehicle for exploring and controlling conflict and cooperation
among States, international law cannot perform its essential function
without seeking inspiration from the social sciences. This is not a one-
sided relationship as it is also apparent that behaviorally-oriented
scholarship cannot single-handedly fulfill that role either.
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